Close the Waste Loopholes: Reassessing Commercial Item Regulations in Federal Procurements by Moye, Jim R.
William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 3
Close the Waste Loopholes: Reassessing
Commercial Item Regulations in Federal
Procurements
Jim R. Moye
Copyright c 2016 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Repository Citation
Jim R. Moye, Close the Waste Loopholes: Reassessing Commercial Item Regulations in Federal
Procurements, 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 33 (2016), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol7/
iss1/3
33
CLOSE THE WASTE LOOPHOLES:
REASSESSING COMMERCIAL ITEM
REGULATIONS IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENTS
JIM R. MOYE*
ABSTRACT
Classifying an item as commercial reduces the governments 
ability to ask for information to determine whether prices are fair
or reasonable, based on the assumption that these prices would
be shaped by market forces. Since changes in procurement laws
in the 1990s, contractors seem to want all items, as well as the
entities that sell these items, to be listed as commercial. Contrac-
tors push for items to be labeled as commercial so they can avoid
nearly all oversight and transparency requirements, which often
results in the government buying blindly.1
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INTRODUCTION
TheMikscheCorporation (TMC)isoneofthelargestdefense
contractorsin theworld. Recently, theUnited StatesDepartment
ofDefense(DoD)awardedTMC acontractworth$5 billiontobuild
fifteen state-of-the-artfighterjets. The contractwith DoD calls
forTMC todeliverthefirstthreefighterjetswithin twenty-four
m onthsofthecontractaward. Asproduction ofthefighterjet
comm ences, TMC entersintonegotiationswith Sandayan Enter-
prises(SEnt)forproduction ofan enginepart. Although theen-
ginepartin question issmallandweighsonlyfifteen pounds, the
partiscriticaltothefighterjetand isthebasisforthe fighter
jets cutting edge technology. SEnt believes the part should be 
deemed com m ercial, having developed sim ilarengine parts for
comm ercialairliners, andarguesthecostofthepartis$125,000
each. TMC disagreesand believesthattheenginepartisappro-
priateonly on thefighterjet, which doesnothavevaluein the
com mercialmarket, and the costofthe partshould be $45,000
each. The partiesnegotiate back and forth overtheirpositions
foran extended period oftim e. Ultimately, thelength ofthene-
gotiations adversely impacts TMCs production schedule, thus 
causingTMC tom issthefirstdeliverydatesforthefighterjetto
the DoD. Meanwhile, the DoD hasinvested an additional$250
million through infrastructure im provements, spare parts pur-
chases, logisticsand supplychain changes, and pilottrainingin
anticipation oftheon-timedeliveryofthefighterjets. Thedeliv-
ery delayswillcostTMC an additional$10 million dollarsand
theDoD $12.5 million.
Thehypotheticalsituation describedabovehappensquiteoften
in the globaldefense industry. Multi-billion dollardefense con-
tractswith theDoD require strictcompliance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)and the Departm ent ofDefense
FAR Supplement(DFARS).2 A controversialgroupofregulations
intheFAR andDFARS revolvesaroundwhethergoodsorservices
are considered com m ercialin nature.3 Ifthey are considered
2 See generally FederalAcquisition RegulationsSystem, 48 C.F.R. §1.104
(2014);48 C.F.R. §2.101;48 C.F.R. §201.104.
3 See Amey& Sm ithberger, supra note1.
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commercial, then the contractor is allowed to charge the gov-
ernment, or prime contractor, whatever the open commercial
marketpriceisforthegoodsorservices. Ifthegoodsorservices
are notcom mercial, then the contractor is required to meeta
numberofadditionalrequirementsrelated topricejustification,
which willm ostassuredlyresultin an overalllowerpricetothe
UnitedStatesgovernm ent.4
Why should the average American care aboutwhether the
federalgovernmentisbuyingcomm ercialgoodsorservices?The
shortanswer is m oney. In fiscalyear 2014, the United States
government spent over $445 billion on federal contracting.5
Comm ercialityregulations, astheyareknown in federalgovern-
mentcontracting, haveadirectim pacton them oneyspentwith
contractorsandthepricesultimatelypaidforgoodsandservices
in supportofthefederalgovernm ent. Asshown in thehypothet-
icalsituation above, thepricedifferentialfora commercialversus
anon-com mercialgoodcan besubstantial.
A realworldexam pleoftheconsequencesofim properutiliza-
tion ofthecom mercialityregulationswasevidentin theUnited
States Air Forces procurement of 117 C-130J aircraft. The Depart-
mentofDefenseOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral(DoDIG)received
allegationsofpoorcontractorperformanceby Lockheed Martin,
whichincludedtheC-130J.6 TheC-130Jperformsintratheaterair-
liftmissionsandisaplatform fordroppingtroopsandequipment
4 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 15.000.403. 
5 See Andy Medici, Defense Department Spending Drops $24 billion in
2014, FED. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.federaltimes.com/story
/government/acquisition/policy/2015/03/25/contract-spending/70342582/ [http://
perma.cc/76FX-G4ZH].
6 See generally U.S. DEPT OF DEF. INSPECTOR GEN., D-2004-102, CON-
TRACTING FOR AND PERFORMANCE OF THE C-130J AIRCRAFT (July 23, 2004),
http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy04/04-102.pdf[http:/perma.cc/86CW-EJJQ].
Thereportreads:
Weperformed thisauditin responsetoallegationstotheDe-
fense Hotline concerning the Defense ContractManagement
Agencys oversight of Lockheed Martins perform ance on the 
C-130, F-22, andC-5 aircraft. Thisisthethirdinaseriesofthree
reportsconcerningtheallegations. Thisreportaddressestheal-
legation thattheC-130Jaircraftdoesnotmeetcontractspeci-
ficationsandthereforecannotperform itsoperationalmission.
Id. ati.
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into hostile areas.7 The aircraftisa medium range, tacticalair-
craftwithmultiplemilitaryservicebranchapplications, including
weatherreconnaissance, electronicwarfaremissions, air-refueling
missions, andsearch and rescuemissions.8 Attheinception ofthe
procurement, the governmentcontracting officerdeemed the air-
crafttobecommercial, whichrelievedLockheedMartin ofproduc-
ing certified costorpricing data tojustifyitspricing.9 Congress
appropriated just over $4 billion for the C-130J development
between 1996 and2004.10 In its2004report, DoDIG determined
thatthe aircraftwasnotcomm ercialin nature,11 theAirForce
failed to properly manage the developmentprogram,12 and the
7 See id; see also Dana Leibelson, We Pause for this Commercial ... Sale,
TIME (May 22, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/05/22/we-pause-for-this-com
mercial-sale/[http://perma.cc/KN6Z-V6TY].
8 See U.S. DEPT OF DEF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note6 at1. TheC-130J
wasdevelopedforusebytheAirMobilityCommand, TheaterCommands, Air
NationalGuard, AirForceReserve, AirForceSpecialOperationsCommand,
MarineCorps, andCoastGuard. Id.
9 See id. at 12. Because of the contracting officers decision to designate 
the aircraftas a commercialitem, FederalAcquisition Regulation Part15,
ContractingbyNegotiation, which allowed accesstocontractorcostand pricing
dataaswellasotherGovernmentoversight, didnothavetobeappliedtothe
C-130J procurem ent. Id. at2.
10 See id. at1.
The contracting officers justification that the aircraft was com-
mercialand the decision to pursue a commercialacquisition
strategy were flawed in severalways. First, the contracting
officerstatedthat95 percentofthefeaturesbetween themili-
taryand civilian versionsoftheaircraftwerethesame;how-
ever, AirFomilrce contracting personnelcould notprovide the
evidencetosupportthatstatement. Thecontractingofficeralso
stated that the aircraft evolved from a series ofLockheed
Martin-produced commercialaircraft. However, themostcur-
rentpriorversion, theC-130H wasonlyused forgovernment
purposes. Thecontractingofficeralsocouldnotproducesupport
for the determination thatmodification to include customer
requirementswould beminor. TheAirForcewasalsounable
to show thatthe commercialspecification was compared to
operationalrequirementsandwouldmeetGovernmentneeds.
Id. at5.
11 See id. at5.
12 See id. at6.
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Office ofthe Secretary ofDefensedid notprovideeffectiveover-
sightofthe C-130J Program to correctsignificantprogram defi-
ciencies.13 The report further noted that 851 deficiencies had
been issued bytheC-130Jend users.14 Further, thegovernm ent
TheAirForcedidnotadequatelymanageprogram operations
orfinancing fortheC-130J. Since1996, theAirForceissued
three, consecutive, firm-fixed-price contracts for the C-130J
aircrafteventhoughLockheedMartincontinuedtoshow little
progressin deliveringcontract-compliantaircraft. In addition,
theAirForcedidnotwithholdsufficientfundsfrom Lockheed
Martin toadequately motivatethecontractortobuild a com-
pliantaircraftandcorrectdeficienciesindeliveredaircraft.
Id.
13 See id. at3.
In addition tothedeficienciesin AirForcemanagementofthe
C-130J aircraft, higher-levelDoD officialswereinformed and
involved in thedecision processand should haveacted toas-
sistin correctingcost, schedule, andperformanceproblemsin
the program. Since September1995, when the AirForce be-
camethemilestonedecision authority, theOfficeoftheUnder
SecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition, Technology, andLogistics
hasprovided limited oversightofthe C-130J Program. How-
ever, officialsin theOfficeoftheUnderSecretary ofDefense
werefullyawareoftheacquisition strategy, thechangestothe
operationalrequirements document, and the deficiency re-
ports on the C-130J Program, butthey did notactto assist
the Air Force in correcting known problems or improve the
managementofthe troubled program. Further, the Office of
theSecretaryofDefensesupported themultiyearcontractby
submittingareporttoCongressforapprovalofthem ultiyear
contract, eventhoughtheC-130Jdesignwasnotstableandthe
C-130 aircraftdidnotmeetthecontractmodelspecificationor
operationalrequirements.
Id. at8.
14 See id. at4.
AirForce and Navy testersand the C-130J users generated
deficiencyreportsthataddressed commercialmodelspecifica-
tions and operationaldeficiencies. The deficiencies fellinto
twocategories. Category 1 deficienciescould causedeath, se-
vereinjury orillness, m ajorlossofequipmentorsystems, or
directlyrestrictcombatoroperationalreadiness, ifuncorrected.
Category2 deficiencieswereallotherdeficienciesthatdidnot
meetthecriteria ofCategory1. Table2 showsthenumberof
open and closed deficiency reports generated on the C-130J
Program asofDecember31, 2003.
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and Lockheed Martin were required to retrofit the delivered
aircraftto compensate for the deficiency reports.15 Even more
em barrassingfortheAirForcewasthe fact that it conditionally 
accepted 50 C-130J aircraftata costof$2.6 billion even though
none ofthe aircraftm etcomm ercialcontractspecifications or
operational requirements.16 AnothercitedconsequenceoftheAir
Forces decision to deem the purchase commercial was a price ad-
justmentmadetoawiringharness.17 Thewiringharnesswasorig-
inally priced at $91 each, but after the Air Forces comm ercial 
determination, the price increased to $453 each.18 The report
concluded thatallegationsthatthe C-130J aircraftdid notm eet
contractspecificationsandwasunabletoperform itsoperational
missionweresubstantiated.19
ThisArticletakesanin-depthlookatthefederalcommerciality
regulations. PartI reviewstheFederalAcquisition Streamlining
Act, which isthefederallaw thatinitiallyencouraged thefederal
governmentto procure more com mercialitemsand contractors
to adoptmore com m ercialmarketpractices. PartII discusses
FAR Part12, which providesspecificguidanceon thetreatment
ofcomm ercialgoodsand servicesin federalcontracting. PartIII
notesspecificregulatory and practicalproblemswith theexisting
com merciality regulations. PartIV providesconcrete stepsand
languagetoim provethecom m ercialityregulations. ThisArticle
concludesthatthe currentcommerciality regulationscreate far
toom uch confusion, which leadstowastein federalcontracting.
TABLE 2. C-130JDEFICIENCY REPORTS
(AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2003)
Category1 Category2 Total
Open 33 151 184
Closed 135 532 667
Total 168 683 851
Id.
15 See id. at4.
16 Id. at3.
17 Leibelson, supra note7.
18 See id.
19 See U.S. DEPT OF DEF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note6 ati. We substan-
tiated the allegation thatthe C-130J aircraftdoes notmeetcontractspecifi-
cations and therefore cannot perform  its operational m ission. Id.
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Thiswastecan beremedied by taking a practicalreview and re-
writingtheregulations.
I. A MOVE TO NORMALIZE THE FEDERAL CONTRACTING MARKET:
THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION STREAMLINING ACT OF 1994
There was a general recognition that the procure-
ment process had become overly complex. ... Some of
it related to the competition requirements to cost and
pricing data that vendors were required to provide
to the regulations that focused, in the view of some
people, more on process than on outcomes.20
A. Wartime Story Highlights the Need for Change
Overtheyears, therehavebeen a num beroffamousstories
relatedtotherigidityofthefederalprocurementprocess. Onesuch
storythathad a greatimpactdatesback totheearly1990s. Dur-
ingOperation DesertStorm, theUnitedStatesArmywasin need
oftwo-way radios.21 Motorola, a largeAmerican telecommunica-
tionscompany, producedaradioforvariouslaw enforcemententi-
ties thatseem ingly matched the Armys stated criteria.22 The
parties could not make the procurement work, as federallaw
prohibitedtheArmyfrom makingtheprocurement.23 Specifically,
federallaw required thatthe price offered to the Arm y be the
lowestpriceoffered toanyone, anywhere, fortheradiosin ques-
tion, andthatMotorolawouldberequiredtosign acertificateto
that fact.24 Motorola could notm ake such a guarantee25 and,
consequently, could notsign a certificatein supportofthefederal
requirement.26 Purportedly, theArm yattempted togetawaiver
20 Michael OConnell, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (1994)FED.
NEWS RADIO (June 8, 2012), http://federalnewsradio.com/acquisition/2012/06
/federal-acquisition-streamlining-act-1994/[http://perma.cc/9LXQ-D6V9](quot-
ingWilliam Woods, formerDirectorofAcquisition and SourcingManagement,
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice).
21 See JACQUES S. GANSLER, DEFENSE CONVERSION 119 (1995).
22 See id. at119.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 Id. Motorolacouldnotmakesuch aclaim becauseitsoldthesameproduct
to localpolice departments through distributors and was notprivy to the
pricepaidbytheindividualpolicedepartments. Id.
26 Id.
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oftherequirementstoprocuretheradios, butwasunsuccessful.27
Ultimately, acompromisesolution developed.28 TheJapanesegov-
ernmentpurchased the radios from Motorola on behalfofthe
United StatesArmyaspartofitscontribution toward supporting
Operation DesertStorm.29
B. Congressional Action Is Taken to Remedy the Situation
In 1994, after a num ber ofreform panels and studies had
been conducted on thefederalcontractingarena and process, and
afterhearing storiessuch asthe United StatesArmy-Motorola
debacle, Congresspassed the FederalAcquisition Stream lining
Actof1994 (FASA).30 FASA m ade sweeping changesto federal
contracting, includingincreasingthesmallpurchasethreshold.31
Otherchangeswerealsomaderegardingcompetition,32 truth in
negotiations,33 procurementprotests,34 and sm allbusiness and
socioeconomic laws.35 One ofthe more significant changes re-
volvedaroundthefederalgovernm ents procurement of com mer-
cial items. Specifically, the law established the definition of
com mercialitems,36 required theinclusion ofcontractclausesto
27 Id. The arm y attem pted to get som eone at a high political level in the 
armytosign awaiveron thislaw, butwasunsuccessful. Noonewasauthorized
to violate the law without congressional approval. Id.
28 See id.
29 Id. The solution to this dilem m a was to have Japan purchase the radios 
from  Motorola and then supply them  to the U.S. Arm y as part of Japans con-
tribution to Operation Desert Storm . Id.
30 Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243. See generally NathanaelCauseyet
al., 1994 Contract Law DevelopmentsThe Year in Review, in DEPT OF THE
ARMY, THE ARMY LAWYER, DEPT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 27-50-267 (Feb. 1995)
at3.
31 See §4001, 108 Stat. at3338. Thelaw changedthesmallpurchasethresh-
oldfrom $25,000 to$100,000. See id.
32 See id. §§ 100193. 
33 See id. §§ 120152. 
34 See id. §§ 140139. 
35 See id. §§ 7101206. 
36 See id. §8001(a). Thedefinitionreads:
(A)Anyitem, otherthan realproperty, thatisofatypecus-
tomarily used by the generalpublicorby non-governmental
entitiesforpurposesotherthan governmentalpurposes, and
that  
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covercommercialitemsin theFAR,37 settheguidelinesforagen-
ciesto acceptcommercialitems,38 created a preference forthe
(i)hasbeen sold, leased, orlicensedtothegeneralpublic;
or
(ii)hasbeen offered forsale, lease, orlicensetothegen-
eralpublic.
(B)Anyitem thatevolved from an item described in sub-
paragraph (A)throughadvancesin technologyorperformance
andthatisnotyetavailableinthecommercialmarketplace, but
willbeavailablein thecommercialmarketplacein timetosat-
isfy the delivery requirements under a FederalGovernment
solicitation.
(C) Any item  that, but for  
(i)m odifications ofa type custom arily available in the
commercialmarketplace, or
(ii)minor modifications made to meet FederalGovern-
ment requirements, would satisfy the criteria in subpara-
graph(A)or(B).
(D)Anycombination ofitemsm eetingtherequirementsof
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or(E)thatareofatypecustomarily
combinedandsoldincom binationtothegeneralpublic.
(E) Installation services, maintenance services, repair
services, training services, and otherservicesifsuch services
are procured for supportofan item referred to in subpara-
graph (A), (B), (C), or (D) and if the source of such services  
(i)offerssuch servicestothegeneralpublicand theFed-
eralGovernmentcontemporaneouslyandundersimilarterms
andconditions;and
(ii)offers to use the sam e work force for providing the
FederalGovernmentwith such servicesasthesourceusesfor
providingsuchservicestothegeneralpublic.
(F)Servicesofferedandsoldcompetitively, in substantial
quantities, in the comm ercialmarketplace based on estab-
lished catalog prices forspecific tasks performed and under
standardcommercialterm sandconditions.
(G)Anyitem, combination ofitems, orservicereferred to
in subparagraphs(A)through (F)notwithstandingthefactthat
theitem, combination ofitems, orserviceistransferredbetween
oramong separatedivisions, subsidiaries, oraffiliatesofa con-
tractor.
(H)A nondevelopmentalitem, iftheprocuringagencyde-
termines, in accordancewith conditionssetforth in theFederal
Acquisition Regulation, thattheitem wasdeveloped exclusively
atprivateexpenseand hasbeen sold in substantialquantities,
onacompetitivebasis, tomultipleStateandlocalgovernments.
Id.
37 See id. §8002(b).
38 See id. §8002(c). Theprovisionstates:
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acquisition ofcommercialitems,39 and createdapresumption that
technicaldata undercontractsforcomm ercialitemsweredevel-
opedexclusivelyatprivateexpense.40 Thesekeycommercialprovi-
sionshad the overtgoalofm aking procurementofcomm ercial
itemseasier, especiallyforthosecompaniesnotentirelyfamiliar
with thefederalgovernmentasacustomer.41 Thelaw wassigned
TheFederalAcquisition Regulationshallprovidethatunder
appropriate conditionsthe head ofan executive agency may
require offerors to dem onstrate that the item s offered  
 (A) have either  
(i)achievedcommercialmarketacceptance;or
(ii) been satisfactorily supplied to an executive
agencyundercurrentorrecentcontractsforthesame
orsimilarrequirem ents;and
(B)otherwisemeettheitem description, specifications, or
othercriteria prescribed in the publicnotice and solicitation
relatingtothecontract.
(2)TheFederalAcquisition Regulation shallprovideguidance
toensurethatthecriteriafordeterminingcommercialmarket
acceptance include the consideration of  
(A)theminimum needsoftheexecutiveagency concerned;
and
(B)theentirerelevantcommercialmarket, includingsmall
businesses.
Id.
39 See id. §8104. Thelaw notes:
Thehead ofan agencyshallensurethat, tothemaximum ex-
tent practicable  
(1)requirementsoftheagency with respecttoa procure-
m ent of supplies or services are stated in term s of  
(A)functionstobeperformed;
(B)performancerequired;or
(C)essentialphysicalcharacteristics;
(2)such requirementsaredefined sothatcommercialitems
or, to the extentthatcommercialitem ssuitable to m eetthe
agencys needs are not available, nondevelopmental items other 
than commercialitems, maybeprocured tofulfillsuch require-
ments;and
(3) offerors of commercial items and nondevelopmental
itemsotherthan commercialitemsareprovidedan opportunity
tocompeteinanyprocurementtofillsuchrequirem ents.
Id.
40 See id. §8106.
41 See generally S. REP. NO. 103-258, at 13 (1994). 
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byPresidentBillClinton on October13, 1994, andcreateda plat-
form forsignificantchangestotheFAR.42
II. IMPLEMENTATION:CHANGING THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION
REGULATION TO BETTER ACCOMMODATE COMMERCIAL
PROCUREMENTS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Theprocurem entregulatorychangesembodiedin FASA were
implementedin theFAR, mostlyin FAR Part12.43 In implement-
ing FASA, the FAR has eight different im portant provisions.
First, theregulationsmakecommercialitem procurementssubject
totheFAR, and ifthereisan inconsistency created by another
provision oftheFAR, Part12 prevails.44 Second, theregulations
requirethatfederalagenciesconsidercontractorpastperformance
data, insideand outsideofthegovernm ent, in theprocurement
ofcom m ercialitems.45 Third, the regulationsrequire, exceptin
specifiedcircumstances, commercialprocurementstoresultinfirm
fixed price contracts orfixed price contractswith econom icad-
justments.46 Fourth, while m aintaining a price reasonableness
42 See Causey, etal., supra note30, at3, 12 n.128.
43 See 48 C.F.R. §12 (2014).
44 See 48 C.F.R. § 12.102(c) (2014). The provision states, Contracts for the 
acquisition ofcommercialitemsare subjectto the policiesin otherpartsof
the FAR. When a policy in anotherpartofthe FAR is inconsistentwith a
policy in thispart, thispart12 shalltake precedence forthe acquisition of
com m ercial item s. Id.
45 See 48 C.F.R. §12.206 (2014). Theregulationnotes:
Pastperformanceshouldbean importantelementofeveryeval-
uation and contractaward forcommercialitems. Contracting
officers should consider pastperformance data from a wide
variety ofsourcesboth insideand outsidetheFederalGovern-
mentin accordancewith thepoliciesand procedurescontained
insubpart9.1, section13.106, orsubpart15.3, asapplicable.
Id.
46 See 48 C.F.R. §12.207 (2014).
(b)(1)A time-and-materials contract or labor-hour contract
(seeSubpart16.6)maybeusedfortheacquisition ofcommer-
cialserviceswhen-
(i) The service is acquired under a contract awarded using  
(A) Competitive procedures (e.g., the procedures in
6.102, the set-aside procedures in Subpart 19.5, or
competitionconductedinaccordancewithPart13);
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determ ination standard for com mercialitem s, the regulations
directthatagenciesalsotakeintoconsideration, aspartofthose
determ inations, severalfactorswhich m ayaffectorim pactcom -
mercialpracticesand therefore, commercialpricing.47 Fifth, the
(B)Theproceduresforotherthan fulland open com-
petition in 6.3 providedtheagencyreceivesoffersthat
satisfy the Governm ents expressed requirem ent from  
twoormoreresponsibleofferors;or
(C)Thefairopportunityproceduresin 16.505 (including
discretionarysmallbusinessset-asidesunder16.505(b)
(2)(i)(F)), ifplacing an orderundera multiple-award
delivery-ordercontract;and
(ii) The contracting officer  
(A)Executesa determination and findings(D&F)for
the contract, in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)of
thissection (butsee paragraph (c)ofthissection for
indefinite-delivery contracts), that no other contract
typeauthorizedbythissubpartissuitable;
(B)Includes a ceiling price in the contractor order
thatthecontractorexceedsatitsownrisk;and
(C)Priortoincreasingtheceilingpriceofatime-and-
m aterials or labor-hour contract or order, shall  
(1)Conductananalysisofpricingandotherrelevant
factorstodetermineiftheaction isin thebestin-
terestoftheGovernment;
(2)Documentthedecision in thecontractororder
file;and
(3)When making a changethatmodifiesthegen-
eral scope of  
(i)A contract, follow theproceduresat6.303;
(ii)An orderissued undertheFederalSupply
Schedules, follow theproceduresat8.405-6;or
(iii) An order issued under multiple award
task and delivery order contracts, follow the
proceduresat16.505(b)(2).
Id.
47 See 48 C.F.R. §12.209 (2014).
Whilethecontractingofficermustestablish pricereasonable-
nessin accordance with 13.106-3, 14.408-2, orsubpart15.4,
asapplicable, the contracting officershould be aware ofcus-
tomary commercialterms and conditions when pricing com-
mercialitems. Commercialitem pricesareaffected byfactors
thatinclude, butarenotlimitedto, speedofdelivery, lengthand
extent of warranty, lim itations of sellers liability, quantities 
ordered, length ofthe performance period, and specific per-
formance requirements. The contracting officermustensure
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regulations specifically restrictthe utilization ofgovernm ental
CostAccountingStandardsforcom m ercialitem procurementsin
firm -fixed-price and fixed-price with economic adjustm entcon-
tracts.48 Sixth, the regulations create a specialacceptance stan-
dardforcommercialitems.49 Specifically, theregulationstatesthat
acceptance of comm ercial item s is based upon the assumption 
that the Government will rely on the contractors assurances that 
thecommercialitem tendered foracceptanceconformstothecon-
tract requirem ents.50 Even with thisspecialacceptanceclause,
theGovernmentstillmaintainstherighttorejectnonconforming
items.51 Seventh, specificregulationsareexcluded from applica-
bility tocommercialitem procurements.52 In primecontracts, the
application ofadiversegroupofregulationsisexcluded, including
forcontingentfees,53 drug-freeworkplaces,54 truthfulcostorpric-
ing data,55 the Truth in NegotiationsAct,56 and CostAccounting
thatcontractterms, conditions, and pricesarecom mensurate
with the Governm ents need. 
Id.
48 See 48 C.F.R. §12.214(2014). Theregulationsread:
CostAccounting Standards (CAS)do notapply to contracts
and subcontractsfortheacquisition ofcommercialitemswhen
thesecontractsand subcontractsarefirm-fixed-priceorfixed-
pricewith economicpriceadjustment(provided thattheprice
adjustmentisnotbasedon actualcostsincurred). See48 CFR
30.201-1 for CAS applicability to fixed-price with economic
price adjustmentcontracts and subcontracts for commercial
itemswhen thepriceadjustmentisbased on actualcostsin-
curred. When CAS applies, thecontractingofficershallinsert
the appropriate provisions and clauses as prescribed in 48
CFR 30.201.
Id.
49 See 48 C.F.R. §12.402 (2014).
50 Id.
51 See id.
52 See 48 C.F.R. §12.503 (2014);48 C.F.R. §12.504(2014).
53 See 48 C.F.R. §12.503(a)(2)(2014). UnderFAR Subpart3.4, contractors
are prohibited from paying contingentfees for soliciting orobtaining Govern-
mentcontractsexceptin specifiedsituations. See generally 48 C.F.R. §3.402.
54 See 48 C.F.R. §12.503(a)(4)(2014). UnderFAR Subpart23.504, contractors
arerequired toprovideadrug-freeworkplaceand usinganumberofspecific
meanstocomplywiththeregulations. See generally 48 C.F.R. §23.504(2014).
55 See 48 C.F.R. §12.503(c)(2)(2014).
56 See id. See generally 48 C.F.R. §15.4(2014).
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Standards.57 In subcontracts, the same regulations are excluded,
plus Validation of Proprietary Data restrictions,58 Examination
of Records of Contractor,59 and Transportation in American Ves-
sels of Government Personnel and Certain Cargo.60 Finally, the
regulations provide for streamlined evaluation processes61 and
solicitations for commercial item offerors.62
III. A MORE COMPLICATED REALITY: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE
COMMERCIALITY REGULATIONS
The overly broad definition of commercial item cur-
rently in effect affords items which are not truly
commercial items and which are not sold to the
general public to qualify as commercial items and
as a result, contracting officers are unable to ac-
quire the necessary data to make the price reason-
ableness determination.63
As previously mentioned, the United States Government spends
over $400 billion annually in contracting.64 Those procurements
include goods and services from a vast array of fields.65 Thus,
the commerciality regulations have to be broad enough to en-
compass the wide array of commercial procurements by the fed-
eral government.66 As currently written, the regulations fail to
accomplish that goal, but instead serve to create more confusion.
57 See 48 C.F.R. § 12.503(c)(3) (2014).
58 See id. § 12.504(a)(5).
59 See id. § 12.504(a)(7).
60 See id. § 12.504(a)(11).
61 See 48 C.F.R. § 12.602 (2014). Under this FAR provision, [F]or many com-
mercial items, the criteria need not be more detailed than technical (capability of
the item offered to meet the agency need), price and past performance. Id.
62 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 12.603. The regulation states, if utilized, cer-
tain data requirements and certification statements. See id.
63 Amber Corrin, Acquisition abuse drives DOD to reassess commercial pur-
chase rules, DEF. SYS. (May 2, 2012), http://defensesystems.com/articles /2012
/05/01/dod-of-a-type-contract-rule-changes.aspx [http://perma.cc/BNY5-QLAF]
(quoting United States Department of Defense Spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin).
64 See Medici, supra note 5.
65 See id.
66 See id.
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A. The Definition of a Commercial Item Is Problematic
Currently, thelengthydefinitionofcommercialitem, whencon-
densed, is any item other than realproperty thatis ofa type
customarily used by thegeneralpublicorby non-governm ental
entitiesforpurposesotherthan governmentalpurposes, andhas
been sold orleased oroffered forsaleorlease.67 Thisdefinition
does little to differentiate between a comm ercial and non-
com mercialitem . For instance, two-way radios, such as those
previously m entioned, could have both governmentaland non-
governm entalapplications. Thereaream ultitudeofbrandsand
types oftwo-way radios. How does this definition differentiate
between governm entaland non-governmentalapplication?This
is notan issue where an item has straightforward com mercial
application. Forinstance, im agineasinglecopierm achinem odel
thatissold toboth governm entaland non-governmentalclients.
Thesamecopierism adeavailableregardlessofthecustom eror
end user. Thereisnoquestion thatthecopierwould neatlyand
easily fitinto the commercialitem definition. Anotherexample
thatmay fitinto the definition isaircraftparts. Aircraftparts
thatare the same would m eetthe definition, whetherthey are
used on comm ercial jetliners or specialized m ilitary aircraft.
However, there are m any m ore complicated scenariosto deter-
m iningcom merciality. Considerthefollowinghypotheticaltosee
theconfusion:
TheAliazonGroup(TAG)developsatwo-wayradiothatissold
in a publicly available catalog to farmersand the agriculture in-
dustry. Theradioshavearangeoftwenty-fivem iles, haveaspe-
cialmetallic coating to make them weatherproof, and come in
eightdifferentcolors. TAG subsequentlydevelopsatwo-wayradio
specifically form ilitary use. Theradioshavea twenty-fivem ile
radius, haveaspecialmetallicweatherproofcoating, comein only
onecolor, haveaspecialshock resistantrubbercase, andaresold
specialorder. Both versionsofthetwo-wayradiosusethesam e
technology, electricalcomponents, and are madeon thesameas-
semblyline. Theonlydifferencesarethatthem ilitaryuseradios
onlycomeinonecolorandhaveashockresistantrubbercase.
67 FederalAcquisition StreamliningActof1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, §8001,
108 Stat. 3243, 3385 (1994).
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Using the currentdefinition provides no easy answer as to
whetherthemilitaryuseradioisreallyacommercialitem. On its
face, themilitaryradioisthesametypeasthoseusedbythefarm
and agricultureindustries. Thefarm and agricultureversion is
soldthrough apubliccatalog. Therefore, astheradiosaresosimi-
lar, itwould seem them ilitaryversion oftheradioshouldeasily
meetthe criteria for a com mercialitem . However, there is an
argum entthatthe military version isnotofthe same type be-
causeithasan additionalcase thatservesa differentpurpose,
and isnotavailablethrough a publiccatalog. Thus, thegeneral
publicwouldnothaveaccesstothatexactradio.
A second issuewith thebroadercommercialitydefinition isin
defining eligible services. Specifically, the definition states [S]er-
vicesofferedandsold competitively, in substantialquantities, in
thecommercialmarketplacebased on established catalogprices
forspecifictasksperformedandunderstandardcommercialterms
and conditions.68 Thedefinition isproblem aticbecauseitpoints
totheneed forcompetition, salesin substantialquantities, and
standard comm ercialterms and conditions. In the com mercial
market, com paniesroutinelyagreetolink theirservicesand no
otherserviceprovidersareinvited toparticipate.69 Forexample,
Hemdan Enterprises (Hemdan)m anufactures and sells copier
m achinesthatareused, withoutchanges, by both privatecom -
paniesand federal, state, and localgovernments. Hemdan hasa
comm ercialagreementwith AlDakhil, Inc. (AD)toprovideallof
thewarranty and repairservicesforthosecopiermachines. AD
provides these services exclusively, does not have comm ercial
contractswith anyothercompanies, and dedicatesitsworkforce
solelytoHemdancopiermachinerepairandwarrantywork. When
Hem dan sellsoneofitscopiers, itincludesapricelistofallwar-
rantyand repairwork and clearlydenotestheservicescan only
be provided by AD in the sales agreem entwith the custom er.
Hem dan sold 750,000 copiermachinesin 2014and AD had over
50,000 service or warranty calls in supportofHemdan. IfAD
attem pted to provide separate repair services for the Hem dan
copierssolddirectlytothegovernm ent, coulditclaim com merci-
alityforitsservices?
68 Id.
69 See generally Phoenix Techs. v. Quotron Sys., No. 94-2068, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5742, at *3637 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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Clearly, based on thehypothetical, AD hasprovided itsser-
vicesin acommercialsetting, hasacom mercialpricelistthatis
distributedtoallHemdan customers, andhasasalesagreement
withthecustomers, which servesastheterm sandconditionsfor
ADs business. However, there seem s to be the missing variable 
of competition. Additionally, the regulation does not define 
competition. Could the com petition for AD to getthe agree-
m entwith Hemdan fulfilltheagreem ent?Hem dan hascom peti-
tors who sellcopier m achines and the governmentcould have
consideredanynumberofthosecompetitors. Couldthatserveas
the basisforcompetition?In short, the absence ofa definition
forcom petition istoovague.
Second, theregulation requiresa substantialquantity ofsales
fortheservices.70 In thehypotheticalabove, AD had50,000 repair
and warranty calls on behalfofHem dan in 2014. Is thatsub-
stantialenough justification for the regulatory provision? The
repairandwarrantycallsimpactedonly6 percentoftheHemdan
copiermachinessold in 2014. WhatifAD only had 1,000 repair
and warranty callsin 2014, thereby impacting lessthan 1 per-
cent of Hem dan copier machines sold? The definition of sub-
stantial quantities is opaque and leaves unnecessary discretion 
toadecision maker.
Third, theprovisionrequiresutilizationofstandardcommercial
terms and conditions.71 Whatconstitutes standard com mercial
termsand conditions?Isitrelated tothecopiermachineindustry
standard?Isitrelatedtothewarrantyandrepairworkindustry?
WhatifHemdan, and AD vicariously, developed term sand con-
ditions that are different than other copier machine retailers?
Theyhavem adewhatisseem inglya largenumberofsalesand
warranty and repaircalls, so doesthatm ake the arrangement
standard?Finally, how couldAD provewhatarestandardterm s
andconditions, especiallyifitdoesnothaveprivitytoothersim-
ilarcompetitoragreements?Itisclearthatonceagain, thelack of
a cleardefinition createsan indistinctrequirementthatishazy
atbest.
70 FederalAcquisition StreamliningAct, Pub. L. No. 103-355, §8001, 108
Stat. 3243 (1994).
71 Id.
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Therefore, thedefinitionsforboth commercialitemsand ser-
vicescreatea levelofambiguitythatwillensureimpreciseappli-
cationsofthelaw.
B. Past Performance Data Consideration
Theregulationsplacegreatim portanceon theconsideration
ofpastperform anceofacomm ercialcontractor. Specifically, the
regulationsrequire thata contracting officerconsiderpastper-
formance data from a plethora ofsources, both inside and out-
sideofthefederalgovernment.72 Whilerequiringpastperformance
consideration is a bestpractice, the concern with this specific
requirementisthesourcingofsuch data.73 Theprovision places
nolimitson thedataconsideredand, therefore, couldleadtothe
consideration ofdatathatisirrelevantorflawed. In theInternet
Age, thereareanum berofsourcesthatm ayhavedubiouscred-
ibility, and there isnothing restricting information from these
sourcesfrom beingconsidered. Forexam ple, imaginetheUnited
StatesDepartmentofTreasuryisconsideringan awardtoHarden
Solutions(Harden)forlaptops. Harden hasnotprovidedlaptops
totheUnited Statesgovernmentbefore, sothereisnopastper-
form ancedata availablein governmentalsources. Unbeknownst
tothecontractingofficer, Hardenhadprovidedthemodeloflaptop
in question toanumberofm unicipalgovernments, butin m uch
smaller numbers than those required in the Treasury Depart-
mentsolicitation. Thelaptopsareclearly a commercialitem, and
in consideringan awardtoHarden, thecontractingofficerdoesan
internet search for Harden and user reviews ofits proposed
product. Thecontractingofficerfindsfivewebsitesthatproduce
these reviews. Fourofthe sites have overwhelmingly negative
reviewsofthelaptop, raisingconcernsaboutthedurabilityofthe
item, and give low assessments of Hardens customer service and 
repaircapability. Thefifth websitehasreviewsthataregenerally
positivetoward thelaptop and Harden. Although allofthesites
aretied tomajorconsumermagazines, theuserreviewsareun-
edited and monitored strictlyforinappropriatelanguage. Based
on thenebulouslanguagein thelaw, thecontractingofficercould
usetheinformation heobtainedon thefourwebsitesasthebasis
72 FederalAcquisitionRegulationsSystem, 48 C.F.R. §12.206 (2014).
73 Id.
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fornotawardingthecontracttoHarden. In thereverse, thecon-
tractingofficercould alsochoosetogivemoreweightorcredence
tothefifthwebsiteandawardtoHardenin thefaceofwhatseems
overwhelm ing evidence of issues. Regardless of the outcom e,
consideration ofsuch uncorroboratedinform ation placesHarden
in an unfairposition. Thereisnothingin thelaw, orin thesup-
portingregulations, thatcould stop a scenariolikethisexam ple
from happening.
Additionally, the lawscreate no boundary forthe quality or
depth ofthepastperformanceinform ation considered.74 Should
a contracting officerconsiderfivesources?Would threesources
be sufficient? Whatnumbers ofsources are sufficientto reach
a conclusion on a contractors capabilities? What if the contract-
ing officeronly considersa singlepastperform ancesource, and
thatsourcewasprovided bythecontractor?In short, thevague-
ness ofthe provision could lead to nebulous pastperform ance
considerations.
C. Price Reasonableness Determination
Finally, the law requires thatthe proposed prices for com -
mercialitems meetthe price reasonableness standard, butin
doingso, considerelem entsofthecomm ercialmarket.75 Further,
the law requires that contracting officers be aware of custom ary 
com m ercial term s and conditions when pricing com m ercial
items.76 Additionally, FASA created a new standard for gov-
ernm entconsideration in contractawardsbym ovingawayfrom
a lowestprice conceptto a bestvalue model.77 These two re-
quirem entscreatesomethingofaconflict. Itmakesperfectsense
forcontractingofficerstoconsiderthecom mercialmarketwhen
determining price reasonableness in its attem pt to ascertain
bestvalue because the very purpose ofFASA wasto bring the
United StatesGovernm entm ore in line with com mercialprac-
tices. However, those comm ercialmarketconsiderationsshould
74 Id.
75 48 C.F.R. §12.209 (2014).
76 Id.
77 48 C.F.R. § 15.303(b)(6) (2014) (The source selection authority shall ... 
[s]elect the source or sources whose proposalis the best value to the Gov-
ernment); 48 C.F.R. § 12.209. 
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not trum p the governm ents need forbestvalue. Itisim practical
to think thatcontracting officers can becom e aware, with any
depth andintelligence, ofcustomarycommercialpracticesacross
the hundreds ofindustriesproviding goodsand servicesto the
governm ent. Further, it is not in the governments best interest 
toletcom mercialm arketdeterm inationshavetoolargeasayin
whatconstitutesbestvalueforthegovernment.
IV. CLEARER STANDARDS:RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECT
COMMERCIAL ITEM REGULATORY DEFICIENCIES
Currently, contractors can label certain goods and
services as commercial, even if the items are never 
bought by the public. This allows contractors to avoid
disclosing information about the costs of creating
the product or service. The result? The government
ends up paying highly questionable prices for cer-
tain items.78
AsdescribedattheoutsetofthisArticle, therearerealworld
consequences to utilization of the com merciality regulations.
Therefore, clearer, betterregulations are needed to ensure the
governmentisprotectedincomm ercialprocurements.
A. Improving the Definitions of Commercial Item and Services
Thecurrentdefinitionsforcommercialitem sandservicesare
toobroadandconfusingforthegovernmentandforthecomm er-
cialm arketcontractors thatthe regulations were intended to
benefit. First, thedefinitionsshould providea clear, brightline
test for application. Additionally, the definitions should have
enough flexibilitytocompensateforthefactthatthedefinitions
willneedtobeappliedacrossnumerousfields. With thatin mind,
the following language isproposed asa new definition ofcom -
mercialitem s:
A commercialitem is defined as any item, other than real
property, thatmeetsoneofthefollowingcriteria:
78 Leibelson, supra note7.
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1. Theitem isoffered, in itsentiretyand withoutchange, to
governmentaland non-governmentalentitiesthrough a pub-
liclyaccessiblemeans;
2. The item has not been offered to any governmentalor
non-governmentalentityandwasdevelopedatthesoleexpense
ofthecontractorwithoutanyassistancebyanygovernmental
entityatanylevel, foreignordomestic;or
3. Theitem isoffered, with modification, togovernmentaland
non-governmentalentities. Themodificationsmustbedemini-
mistotheutilization oftheitem, specificallymeaningthatthe
item can stillfunctionasintendedwithoutthemodification.
In ordertoqualifytheitem ascommercial, theprimecontractor
or subcontractor m ustprovide sufficientinformation, as de-
terminedbytheContractingOfficer, tomeetthedefinitions.79
Theproposeddefinition seekstoaddressthemostcommon sit-
uationsin which commercialitemsare utilized. First, the m ost
common, and m osteasily resolved, commercialitem sare those
offeredtoboth governmentalandnon-governmentalentities, with-
outany form ofmodification and made available through som e
publicly accessed meanssuch ascatalogs, websites, listserves,
orflyers. So, tomakereferencetoan earlierpartofthisArticle,
an exam plewould bea copiermachinethatisthesameregard-
less ofthe custom er. The second definition is m eant to cover
itemsthathavebeen newlydevelopedatthesolecostofthecon-
tractor, buthave notyetbeen offered on the open market. The
definition specificallynotesthatexpensecostsbornebyanygov-
ernmentwould exclude itfrom consideration under this defini-
tion. Finally, thethirddefinitionismeanttocoverthosesituations
wheretherearetrulyminordifferencesbetween thegovernm en-
taland non-governm entalapplication ofan item . These three
definitionsprovideenoughflexibilityforacomm ercialcontractor
tohaveitem sappropriately qualified, withoutm uch ofthecon-
fusion thatexists today. Further, the provision places the re-
sponsibility ofproving com m erciality on theprimecontractoror
subcontractor, andincludesan obligation toprovideenough infor-
mation forthecontractingofficertomakean informed decision.
Thisgivesthe contractoran opportunity to produce criticalin-
formation and thecontracting officersufficientcontroloverthe
79 48 C.F.R. §12.206.
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situation to make an accurate decision and protectthe govern-
ments interests. 
Asforcommercialservices, thefollowinglanguageisproposed:
A commercialserviceisdefinedasanyservicethatmeetsone
ofthefollowingcriteria:
1. Services to assess, repair or remove a commercialitem
throughpubliclyaccessiblemeans;
2. Technicalor management services not in support of a
commercialitem thatare available to governmentalornon-
governmentalentitiesthroughpubliclyaccessiblem eans;or
3. Services, withoutm odification, provided to governmental
and non-governmental entities through publicly accessible
means.
Inordertoqualifytheserviceascommercial, theprimecontrac-
tororsubcontractormustprovidesufficientinformation, asde-
terminedbytheContractingOfficer, tomeetthedefinitions.80
Thesedefinitionsservea practicalpurpose. First, theinitial
definition for commercialservices is tied to com mercialitem
support. Theoretically, itmakessense thatservicessupporting
com m ercialitem s should also be considered com m ercialin na-
ture. In oneoftheprevioushypotheticals, acompanythatsolely
provides repair and warranty supportto a specific copier m a-
chine(orlineofcopiermachines)would qualifyasa comm ercial
service under this definition. The second definition focuses on
commercialservicesthatarenotnecessarilytied toa commercial
item. For instance, information technology consulting services
would beagood candidateforthiscategory. Theconsultingfirm
providestechnicalservicesconsulting tothepublicatlargeand
theonly distinction in priceisrelated tothesizeoftheengage-
m ent. However, theexpertiseutilizedforeach customer, regard-
lessofgovernmentalstatus, isthesame. Thethird definition is
m eant to serve as a catch-all forservicesthatarecom mercial
in nature, butdo notfitneatly into the other two categories.
Finally, aswith the com mercialitem determination, the prim e
contractor or subcontractor is required to subm it supporting
documentation and the contracting office has the flexibility to
makethenecessarydecision.
80 Id.
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B. Creating Boundaries for Past Performance Data
As previously noted,81 the currentregulations do notplace
sufficientboundarieson information utilized in consideringpast
performance. In creatingthenecessaryboundaries, I contend that
thecontractorshould begiven an opportunitytoprovideevidence
ofpastperformanceand thecontracting officershould begiven
the freedom to consider other instances ofpast perform ance.
Therefore, thefollowinglanguageisproposed:
TheContractingOfficershallconsiderpastperformanceprior
totheaward ofany contractcontaining commercialitem sor
services. Said pastperformanceshallbeforthesam eorsimi-
laritems or services. The orderofprecedence forsuch past
performancedatashallbe:
1. Datafrom federalgovernmentsources;
2. Datafrom otherdomesticgovernmentsources;or
3. Dataprovidedbytheproposedcontractororsubcontractor.
Theprimecontractororsubcontractorshallsubmititsdatain
tandem with itsproposal. TheContractingOfficershouldcon-
sideratleastthree sourcesin considering pastperformance.
Ifthe Contracting Officerconsidersmore orlesssources, an
explanation shallbeprovided totheHead oftheContracting
Activityuponaward.
The proposed language creates a clear order ofprecedence
when considering pastperform ance because itwilladdressthe
issueofimbalancedapplicationoftheregulations. First, thebest
sourceforrelevantpastperformance is the federal governments 
own sources. Thefederalgovernmenthasan extensivecontrac-
tor evaluation process with a prim ary purpose ofdetermining
contractorpastperform ance. The second source isforstate, lo-
cal, andm unicipalgovernm entsthatm ayalsocollectsuch data.
The premise is thatm any dom estic (i.e. non-federalU.S. gov-
ernmentalbodies)alsodobusinesswith comm ercialcontractors,
and utilizing any data thesegovernm entshavestored would be
helpful. Third, the proposed language givescontractorsorsub-
contractors the opportunity to submit past perform ance data.
Therem aybeinstanceswherebythecontractorhasnotprovided
theitemsorservicestoagovernm entalentityand thiswillgive
81 Id.
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the contracting officer a starting pointto considerpastperfor-
mance. Finally, theproposed languagestatesthatthecontracting
officer should consider at least three sources for past perfor-
m ancedata, and createsan obligation toexplain totheHead of
theContractingActivityifmoreorfewersourcesareconsidered.
Thisaddressestheissueofthebreadth and depth a contracting
officer must go through in past performance. By placing con-
trolled boundaries, and giving the contractoran opportunity to
weighin, itlevelstheplayingfield.
C. Unambiguous Guidance on Price Reasonableness
Aspreviouslynoted, thereisnodisagreementwith placinga
pricereasonablenessrequirementon theprocurementofcommer-
cialitems and services. However, the factors the contracting
officershould considermustensurethefederalgovernmentgets
thebestvaluein itsprocurements. Tothatend, thefollowinglan-
guageisproposed:
TheContractingOfficershallaward contractsforcommercial
itemsonlyafterdeterminingthattheoffered priceisfairand
reasonable. In determiningwhethertheproposed priceisfair
and reasonable, theContracting Officerwillconsiderthefol-
lowingfactors, in thisorder:
1. Best value for the government as ascertained through
federalpricingdatabases;
2. Marketresearch;
3. Supporting docum entation provided by the contractor;
andCommercialmarketpractices.
The prime contractorisresponsible forthe submission ofits
supporting documentation. Failuretosubmitsupporting doc-
umentation, orsufficientdocumentation todeterminepricerea-
sonableness, as determined by the Contracting Officer, may
resultinadverseactionin theawardprocess.
Theproposedpricereasonablenessdefinitionaddressesanum-
berofissues. First, itcreatestheprim ary priority ofbestvalue
forthefederalgovernment. Second, itincreasestheresponsibility
ofthecontractingofficertoconductm arketresearch in thesolic-
itation process. To ensure the governm entis notblindsided in
itsbudgetingforprocurements, itiscriticalthatthecontracting
officerconducttimely, appropriate marketresearch. Third, the
proposed language places a responsibility on the contractor to
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provethepriceisfairand reasonable. Thismaybeinterpreted as
anotherwayofobligatingthecontractortoprovidecostorpricing
data. In fact, itisnot. Thecontractordoesnothavetoprovidea
certification forthe information subm itted underthisproposal.
Additionally, thecontractorcan explain why the proposed pric-
ingiscompetitiveandshouldbeabletoprovideevidencetothat
end. The requirementis notas intense as the certified costor
pricing data process. Fourth, the governmentshould use com-
mercialm arketpractices in determining price reasonableness.
Finally, theproposed languageplacesa directobligation on the
contractor to supportprice reasonableness procedure and pro-
vides for consequences ifthe contractor does notassist. Allof
thisensuresthatthe governmentgetsthe bestvalue, butalso
givesthecontractortwoopportunitiestojustifyitspricing.
CONCLUSION
Congress m ade a valianteffortto rem ake the governm ent
procurem entsystem intoa truecomm ercialmarketplace. How-
ever, thatefforthas fallen short. The currentregulations that
supportcom m ercialprocurem entutilize ambiguousdefinitions,
provide poorguidance on pastperformance consideration data,
and offer conflicting standards for determ ining price reason-
ableness. By strengthening the regulations through clear and
unambiguousrewrites, the governm entcould close som e ofthe
wide loopholes in the law. Failure to do so willresultin m ore
financialfiascos, such astheLockheed Martin C-130Jaircraft.82
A few strokesofthepen could saveAm erican taxpayersbillions
ofdollars. DoesCongresshavetheintestinalfortitudetom akeit
happen?A strong, efficientfederalprocurementsystem isriding
ontheanswer.
82 U.S. DEPT OF DEF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note6.
